22 Bình luận
  • CONGTM09

    Vietnam is emerging as a winner from the era of deglobalisation


    Yet achieving its goal of becoming a rich country by 2045 will still be a huge task


    Antony to swaggers between the rows of humming machines in his factory in Bac Ninh province, in Vietnam’s north-east, as they spit out blistering-hot bits of plastic. His firm, Hanpo Vina, ships the bits to the Samsung plant down the road as well as to nearby makers of printers, speakers, laptops and other electronic items. Mr To picks a Brazil-bound Samsung phone charger from a counter and displays it proudly. On the back, laser-etched in Portuguese, is a version of that familiar stamp of globalisation: Fabricado no Vietname.


    That message—Made in Vietnam—has been emblazoned on ever more products in umpteen languages since the formerly communist economy started opening up and promoting private enterprise in the late 1980s. Since 2000, Vietnam’s gdp has grown faster than that of any Asian country bar China, averaging 6.2% per year. It has lured big foreign firms in droves. What started with apparel makers such as Nike and Adidas seeking low-skilled labour has turned into a boom in electronics—higher-value goods that create better-paid jobs for more highly skilled workers. In 2020 electronics made up 38% of Vietnam’s goods exports, up from 14% of a much smaller pie in 2010 (see chart).


    The trade war between America and China, which started in 2018, has helped. In 2019 Vietnam produced nearly half of the $31bn-worth of American imports that moved from China to other low-cost Asian countries (though some of these goods were probably just modified Chinese-made ones stamped “Made in Vietnam”).

    Add to that growing geopolitical tensions between the superpowers, China’s onerous pandemic restrictions and its rising labour costs, and it is easy to see why many big firms are turning to Vietnam. Apple’s biggest suppliers, Foxconn and Pegatron, which make Apple Watches, MacBooks and other gadgets, are building big factories in Vietnam and look set to join the ranks of the country’s largest employers. Other big names moving chunks of production from China to Vietnam include Dell and hp (laptops), Google (phones) and Microsoft (game consoles).


    All of which could lead to more growth, and make millions of Vietnamese people better off. That in turn could boost the popularity of the Communist Party, which has run the country as a one-party state since the end of the war in 1975. The government wants Vietnam to become rich—with gdp per person exceeding $18,000, up from just $2,800 today—by 2045. It hopes to do this partly by moving from cheap garments to complex electronics that require investment and skilled labour.

    Vietnam has many things working in its favour. Its workforce will remain young and sprightly as China’s ages and shrinks. The country is an enthusiastic member of over a dozen free-trade agreements, giving it easier access to scores of national markets. Its political leaders are less skittish about covid-19 than China’s, too. Vietnam fully reopened its borders in March. China retains many barriers to entry.

    The country of some 100m people also has geographical blessings, such as more than 3,000km of coastline. And it is right on China’s doorstep. Thanks to massive infrastructure spending on things like new roads, its electronics cluster is just a 12-hour drive from Shenzhen, China’s tech capital. “You don’t have to reinvent your supply chains here,” says one industrial-park operator. The government’s knack for staying cosy with both China and America is valuable, too.

    Yet there is still plenty to be done if Vietnam’s factories are to move farther up the value chain. Its manufacturing base is still much shallower than China’s. Foreign firms would love to buy more parts locally, which could be faster and more convenient than sourcing them from just over the border. But they usually fail to find what they seek.

    The Hanpo Vina factory of which Mr To is justly proud illustrates not only what Vietnam has achieved but also the limits of that success. It is a rare domestic supplier of parts to an important foreign manufacturer. But the plastic bits it makes are some of the simplest in Samsung’s Galaxy phones. Moreover, its plastic-injection machines are imported from South Korea. The resin they mould into plastic comes from China. The Vietnamese stuff does not meet Samsung’s quality standards, admits Mr To. This sort of work is at the lower end of the electronics value chain, rewarded with lower pay, and easier for other countries with unskilled workers to swipe.

    Nor can Vietnam simply copy out of the playbook of China or South Korea. Globalisation is falling out of favour. Big markets are reshoring. Trade deals prohibit the state-aid tactics used by some other countries that went from poverty to prosperity. A former Vietnamese official notes that the Chinese government was able to set the rules for foreign companies keen to sell to China’s vast market. “In Vietnam we don’t have the power,” she says.

    Foreign investment helps, but it will take time to show results. Next year Samsung will open a research facility in Hanoi, the capital. It is also looking into setting up semiconductor factories in the country. In May Pham Minh Chinh, the prime minister, joined leaders of other South-East Asian countries for a summit with President Joe Biden in Washington. But he also used the trip to drop by the Silicon Valley headquarters of Apple, Google and Intel.

    The government has its own part to play. Workers are plentiful in Vietnam but talented managers are rare. So are skilled technicians. Although Vietnam already punches well above its income level for schooling, its university and vocational-training programmes need a boost. Michael Nguyen, the country head of Boeing, an aerospace giant that sources some parts in Vietnam, suggests firms such as his could work closely with universities to tailor training to what they need. If Vietnam is to grow as rich as China, let alone Japan, South Korea or Taiwan, it will have to invest not just in infrastructure, but also in its people. 

  • CONGTM09

    Vietnam is emerging as a winner from the era of deglobalisation


    Yet achieving its goal of becoming a rich country by 2045 will still be a huge task


    Antony to swaggers between the rows of humming machines in his factory in Bac Ninh province, in Vietnam’s north-east, as they spit out blistering-hot bits of plastic. His firm, Hanpo Vina, ships the bits to the Samsung plant down the road as well as to nearby makers of printers, speakers, laptops and other electronic items. Mr To picks a Brazil-bound Samsung phone charger from a counter and displays it proudly. On the back, laser-etched in Portuguese, is a version of that familiar stamp of globalisation: Fabricado no Vietname.


    That message—Made in Vietnam—has been emblazoned on ever more products in umpteen languages since the formerly communist economy started opening up and promoting private enterprise in the late 1980s. Since 2000, Vietnam’s gdp has grown faster than that of any Asian country bar China, averaging 6.2% per year. It has lured big foreign firms in droves. What started with apparel makers such as Nike and Adidas seeking low-skilled labour has turned into a boom in electronics—higher-value goods that create better-paid jobs for more highly skilled workers. In 2020 electronics made up 38% of Vietnam’s goods exports, up from 14% of a much smaller pie in 2010 (see chart).


    The trade war between America and China, which started in 2018, has helped. In 2019 Vietnam produced nearly half of the $31bn-worth of American imports that moved from China to other low-cost Asian countries (though some of these goods were probably just modified Chinese-made ones stamped “Made in Vietnam”).

    Add to that growing geopolitical tensions between the superpowers, China’s onerous pandemic restrictions and its rising labour costs, and it is easy to see why many big firms are turning to Vietnam. Apple’s biggest suppliers, Foxconn and Pegatron, which make Apple Watches, MacBooks and other gadgets, are building big factories in Vietnam and look set to join the ranks of the country’s largest employers. Other big names moving chunks of production from China to Vietnam include Dell and hp (laptops), Google (phones) and Microsoft (game consoles).


    All of which could lead to more growth, and make millions of Vietnamese people better off. That in turn could boost the popularity of the Communist Party, which has run the country as a one-party state since the end of the war in 1975. The government wants Vietnam to become rich—with gdp per person exceeding $18,000, up from just $2,800 today—by 2045. It hopes to do this partly by moving from cheap garments to complex electronics that require investment and skilled labour.

    Vietnam has many things working in its favour. Its workforce will remain young and sprightly as China’s ages and shrinks. The country is an enthusiastic member of over a dozen free-trade agreements, giving it easier access to scores of national markets. Its political leaders are less skittish about covid-19 than China’s, too. Vietnam fully reopened its borders in March. China retains many barriers to entry.

    The country of some 100m people also has geographical blessings, such as more than 3,000km of coastline. And it is right on China’s doorstep. Thanks to massive infrastructure spending on things like new roads, its electronics cluster is just a 12-hour drive from Shenzhen, China’s tech capital. “You don’t have to reinvent your supply chains here,” says one industrial-park operator. The government’s knack for staying cosy with both China and America is valuable, too.

    Yet there is still plenty to be done if Vietnam’s factories are to move farther up the value chain. Its manufacturing base is still much shallower than China’s. Foreign firms would love to buy more parts locally, which could be faster and more convenient than sourcing them from just over the border. But they usually fail to find what they seek.

    The Hanpo Vina factory of which Mr To is justly proud illustrates not only what Vietnam has achieved but also the limits of that success. It is a rare domestic supplier of parts to an important foreign manufacturer. But the plastic bits it makes are some of the simplest in Samsung’s Galaxy phones. Moreover, its plastic-injection machines are imported from South Korea. The resin they mould into plastic comes from China. The Vietnamese stuff does not meet Samsung’s quality standards, admits Mr To. This sort of work is at the lower end of the electronics value chain, rewarded with lower pay, and easier for other countries with unskilled workers to swipe.

    Nor can Vietnam simply copy out of the playbook of China or South Korea. Globalisation is falling out of favour. Big markets are reshoring. Trade deals prohibit the state-aid tactics used by some other countries that went from poverty to prosperity. A former Vietnamese official notes that the Chinese government was able to set the rules for foreign companies keen to sell to China’s vast market. “In Vietnam we don’t have the power,” she says.

    Foreign investment helps, but it will take time to show results. Next year Samsung will open a research facility in Hanoi, the capital. It is also looking into setting up semiconductor factories in the country. In May Pham Minh Chinh, the prime minister, joined leaders of other South-East Asian countries for a summit with President Joe Biden in Washington. But he also used the trip to drop by the Silicon Valley headquarters of Apple, Google and Intel.

    The government has its own part to play. Workers are plentiful in Vietnam but talented managers are rare. So are skilled technicians. Although Vietnam already punches well above its income level for schooling, its university and vocational-training programmes need a boost. Michael Nguyen, the country head of Boeing, an aerospace giant that sources some parts in Vietnam, suggests firms such as his could work closely with universities to tailor training to what they need. If Vietnam is to grow as rich as China, let alone Japan, South Korea or Taiwan, it will have to invest not just in infrastructure, but also in its people. 

  • freshdeno

    Ko cùng tầm nhìn với tác giả bài báo. 😊 Vn còn phải đi 1 đoạn đường rất xa nữa mới bắt kịp Đài Loan hay HQ.

  • riverhood

    nước giàu là tôi vui rồi, mặc dù bài báo nói chỉ một góc độ, nhưng phải xem báo cáo gdp đầu ng từ 2019 đến 2022 xem tăng bao nhiêu rồi

  • Vinhhieu

    Đọc bài báo này xong em cảm thấy phấn chấn, sáng đã được tiếp thêm năng lượng từ VTV. Thôi, e đi bán vé số cử tối tiếp đây.

  • hxnb

    Càng phát triển thì càng mệt mỏi thôi

  • dongtataydoc88

    Kỷ nguyên phi toàn cầu hoá là gì. Nghe vô lý vl

    • vcd2403

      @dongtataydoc88 mình ko đọc bài, tại đếch biết tiếng anh!

      Mình coi cái tiêu đề của thớt thôi, thì có thể thấy nôm na rằng bài này ngụ ý nói về nguyên nhân chúng ta ít bị ảnh hưởng bởi lạm phát và các vấn đề rủi ro đối với an ninh kinh tế bởi vì CHÚNG TA LUÔN TỰ CHỦ, ĐỘC LẬP, KO PHỤ THUỘC vào bất kỳ yếu tố nhất định nào!


      Dù xung quang chết hết cũng chưa chắc làm ta chết theo! Cùng lắm bị thương liệt 1 chỗ thôi


      và cái từ KỶ NGUYÊN PHI TOÀN CẦU HOÁ ở đây xuất phát từ việc các nước lớn đã quá phụ thuộc vào thương mại toàn cầu, đến nỗi nếu chuỗi cung ứng đứt gãy, họ sẽ bị ảnh hưởng cực lớn!

      Ví dụ như eu: cung ứng khí đốt đứt gãy, họ khó mà đảm bảo đc an ninh năng lượng trong nước!

      Hoặc cov xẩy ra, đứt gãy chuỗi cung ứng tất cả các nước trên thế giới đối mặt rất nhiều thiếu hụt…


      Từ đó, các qg phát triền này muốn GIẢM SỰ PHỤ THUỘC vào 1 yếu tố nhất định nào đó - giảm phụ thuộc nga, giảm phụ thuộc tàu, mỹ… !


      Nhưng việc PHI TOÀN CẦU HOÁ có giải quyết đc vấn đề 1 cách thực sự ko, thì chưa ai dám chắc cả!

      Mọi thứ luôn tồn tại mâu thuẫn!

      Họ đi ngược lại quá trình toàn cầu hoá để mong muốn giải quyết vấn đề và phát triển, nghe nó rất hài hài

  • truongan91

    đánh đổi cả đấy, vnd tỉ giá thấp top 3 thế giới, môi trường tổn hại nghiệm trọng.

Website liên kết